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Abstract: The objective of the paper is to assess the relationship between a set of 
competitiveness indicators and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows with reference to the 
size and transition-economy status of a heterogeneous set of 60 countries. Results suggest that 
an increase of competitiveness is robustly, statistically and sizably related to an increase of FDI 
inflows. Goods market efficiency, market size and business sophistication were identified to 
have been particularly important for FDIs. However, the positive relationship between 
competitiveness and FDI is weakened or wiped out in a small country, suggesting that, because 
of their size, small countries need to undertake extra efforts in converting their improvements 
in competitiveness to work in favour of FDI attraction. On the other hand, we do not find robust 
evidence that transition economies are disadvantaged in improving their competitiveness to 
attract FDIs. Given that many transition economies are small, we suggest that it has been rather 
the size of the country and not the fact that it has gone through a transition process, which may 
have affected how its competitiveness works for attracting FDI. 
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Introduction 
Economies engage in improving competitiveness in order to increase growth and income. FDI 
have become an important instrument for realizing these goals. FDI is expected to positively 
affect the productivity and efficiency in allocating resources in the host country by transferring 
technology and know-how. Yet, attracting FDI is challenging, given that it depends on various 
factors that should exist simultaneously. As Wilhelms et al. (1998) note, countries’ ability to 
attract FDI depends on their capacity to adapt governments, markets, educational systems and 
social and cultural contexts to be attractive to the reception of FDI flows.  
A set of relevant factors which may drive FDI flows has been incorporated in a comprehensive 
framework established by the World Economic Forum to measure economic competitiveness 
in comparative context across countries. The Global Competitiveness Index, published yearly 
in the Global Competitiveness Report, captures a range of different aspects of competitiveness 
followed by investors. The index calculation relies on 12 pillars: institutions, infrastructure, 
macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, 
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goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market development, 
technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, and innovation.  
Despite the fact that there is an all-encompassing theoretical framework for the determinants 
of FDI flows, the empirical studies exploring these determinants in a comprehensive 
framework, are very limited. Our research seeks to fills this gap by estimating the importance 
of the 12 competitiveness pillars of the Global Competitiveness Index on FDI inflows in a 
heterogeneous set of countries. Furthermore, this paper contributes to identifying the 
differences associated with small and transition countries. These characteristics have been 
rarely investigated in the empirical literature and therefore, we attempt to discover whether 
small and/or transition economies are advantaged or disadvantaged in improving their 
competitiveness to attract FDI. In this context, even though there is no clear threshold of the 
small size of the country in economic theory, we consider the small country in this research if 
it has less than 3 million inhabitants (Armstrong et al., 1998). The transition countries are all 
former centrally planned economies from Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, as well 
as countries from the former Soviet Union.  
The analysis uses a dataset for countries belonging to the European Economic Area as well as 
from the Western Balkans, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Middle-East and North 
Africa, which gravitate closely to the European Union in geographic and economic terms. The 
following 60 countries are analyzed: Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, North Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, 
Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
United Arab Emirates and United Kingdom. The analysis is conducted in a pooled OLS 
framework for the period 2007-2017. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature on the determinants of FDI flows. In Section 3, we elaborate the model 
and methodology and present the data and variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 
discusses our empirical findings. Section 5 presents some concluding remarks. 
 
Theoretical and empirical literature 
There has already been an extensive theoretical discussion about the factors that determine FDI 
flows (e.g., Simpson, 1962; Frankel, 1965; Kindleberger, 1969; Caves, 1971; Cohen, 1975; 
Helpman, 1984; Froot and Stein, 1991; Graham, 1996; Altomonte and Pennings, 2003; Latorre, 
2008; Nayak and Choudhury, 2014). FDIs were typically seen as an international movement 
of physical capital in search of higher returns (Mundell, 1956). This theory was further 
elaborated by MacDougall (1958) and Kemp (1964) in a framework assuming perfectly 
competitive market. If there was free movement of capital from an investing country to a host 
country, the marginal productivity of capital tended to be equalized between the two. However, 
Hymer (1976) emphasized that in a world characterized by perfect competition, FDI would not 
have occurred if some form of distortion did not exist. In this context, he laid grounds for a 
theory based on an imperfect market setup. His theory pointed out that foreign firms must offset 
the disadvantages they have in comparison with host firms in terms of culture, language, legal 
system and consumer preference by exploiting some form of market power. It may arise from 
patent-protected superior technology, brand names, marketing and management skills, 
economies of scale and cheaper sources of finance. These sources of market power encourage 
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a firm to invest in a foreign country in order to fully exploit the monopolistic advantages and 
render international investment profitable.  
In a similar context characterized with oligopolistic market imperfections, apart from increased 
access to the host country’s market and utilization of its abundant factors, Knickerbocker 
(1973) formulated another motivation for investing abroad which is explained by the intention 
to match a rival’s move. More specifically, firms often imitate their rivals who change their 
strategies from exporting to setting up a manufacturing subsidiary in the host country. In this 
way, they expect to reduce the risk of being undercut by rivals and to preserve their strategic 
advantage. Market imperfections are also considered by Buckley and Casson (1976) to explain 
the internalization of FDI by putting emphasis on intermediate inputs and technology. Firms 
internalize by using backward and forward integration. Namely, the technology or output of a 
subsidiary in one country can be used as an input to the production of a different subsidiary in 
another country. 
Dunning (1980) combined the FDI motivations driven by market imperfections that had been 
expounded in previous theories and expanded the combined theoretical framework with a 
locational aspect to explain why firms invest abroad. Thus, FDI is dependent on three sets of 
factors that should exist simultaneously and are summarized in so called OLI framework: O – 
ownership advantage, L - location advantage and I - internalization advantage. The ownership 
advantage focuses on developing a competitive advantage by the foreign firm in terms of 
specific technology or skill to be used to compete with local firms in the host country. The 
location advantage addresses the profitability of the foreign firm as regard to locating its 
business outside the home country. Finally, the internalization advantage compares the costs 
and benefits for the foreign firm having established a subsidiary vis-à-vis hiring a company 
licensed to provide goods and/or services in the host country. While the first and the third factor 
are related to the home-country characteristics, allowing a firm to develop competitive 
advantage and become multinational, the second factor, location advantage, is host-country 
specific (Resmini, 2000). The latter encompasses various determinants such as host country’s 
market size, economic growth, labour cost, levels of competition, technology, infrastructure, 
political and legal environment and government policy (UNCTAD, 1998; Wang et al., 2009). 
On the empirical side, a wide range of factors has been estimated as significant in interfering 
with FDI flows. Kravis and Lipsey (1982) estimated a positive effect of market size on FDI. 
Resmini (2000) reached a similar conclusion for Central and Eastern Europe, estimating that 
countries with larger populations draw investors’ attention and induce higher FDI inflows than 
smaller countries. Infrastructure also plays an important role in directing FDI flows (Coughlin 
et al., 1991). As for the macroeconomic variables, Froot and Stein (1991) and Klein and 
Rosengren (1994) pointed out that exchange rate depreciation has a positive impact on FDI 
flows. Root and Ahmed (1979) and Schneider and Frey (1985) found that FDI is significantly 
affected by political instability, while Wei (2000) estimated that an increase in the degree of 
corruption results in smaller FDI flows. Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) also found that 
bureaucracy, corruption and legal institutions are important determinants of FDI. Lahrèche-
Révil (2006) estimated that high tax rates have negative impacts on FDI. Narula and Wakelin 
(1998) put technology at the core of competitiveness and suggest that inward FDI is influenced 
by technological capability and human capital availability. 
Most of the empirical studies investigating determinants of FDI flows focused on selected 
aspects of the host country characteristics reflecting its competitiveness. A more 
comprehensive approach in examining a broader set of competitiveness factors which may 
influence FDI flows is adopted by Anastassopoulos (2007). His study takes into account four 
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pillars on which competitiveness is measured in the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook: 
economic performance, governmental efficiency, business efficiency and infrastructure. The 
results which refer to the EU-15 member states suggest that FDI determinants differ between 
northern and southern EU member states. In the northern economies, investors are driven by 
market size, reduced bureaucracy, and the openness and efficiency of the business sector; in 
the south, they are more interested in the efficiency of the government and the reduction of 
investment risk. More research on the competitiveness-FDI nexus using cross-section data for 
129 countries in 2010 suggests that competitiveness (measured by the Global Competitiveness 
Index) and levels of corruption (measured by the Corruption Perception Index) of the host 
country are important determinants of FDI inflows (Curtis et al., 2013). 
Our study enriches this empirical space by using a wide set of competitiveness indicators which 
may reflect the host country attractiveness for FDI inflows and brings the small and transition 
countries to the fore in this research. Although there are a few studies suggesting that foreign 
investors are swayed by market size (Kravis and Lipsey, 1982; Resmini, 2000; 
Anastassopoulos, 2007), the empirical work did not focus on exploring the behaviour of foreign 
investors depending on the transition status of the country. Thus, we shed light on the possible 
effect of competitiveness indicators on FDI by probing how small and transition countries are 
considered by foreigners when they consider whether and how much to invest.  
 
Model and methodology 
Based on our theoretical and empirical discussion in Section 2, we define a model which 
includes a set of determining factors that are related to location advantages of the OLI 
framework. Thus, our model includes the following host country FDI determinants: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼௜௧ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛽௝𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠௜௧ + 𝛾௝𝑋௜௧ᇱ + 𝛿ଵ𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙௜௧ + 𝛿ଶ𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜௧ +
𝛿ଷ𝐸𝑈௜௧  + 𝛼௧ + 𝜀௜௧          (1) 
 
Whereby 𝐹𝐷𝐼௜௧ stands for the log of the inward FDI in country i in period t, in US dollar; 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠௜௧  is a competitiveness indicator, capturing a wide set of competitiveness 
facets of country i in period t, as follows: institutions; infrastructure; macroeconomic 
environment; health and primary education; higher education and training; goods market 
efficiency; labour market efficiency; financial market development; technological readiness; 
market size; business sophistication; and innovation. 𝑋௜௧ᇱ  is a vector of explanatory variables, 
frequently used in the literature: the log of the GDP per capita in US dollar, trade to GDP, 
domestic credit to private sector in GDP, inflation, total tax as share in commercial profits, 
government net lending in GDP, the customs burden and the unemployment rate. 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙௜௧ is a 
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the country has less than 3 million inhabitants and 0 
otherwise; 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜௧ is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the country is a former 
central planner and 0 otherwise; 𝐸𝑈௜௧ is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the country is 
a member of the EU and 0 otherwise. 𝛼௧ stands for year fixed effects, while 𝜀௜௧ is the usual 
disturbance term which is assumed to be well-behaved. Annex 1 provides information about 
the definition and sources of variables used. 
Note that we do not use country-fixed effects because the three dummy variables defined –
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙௜௧, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜௧, 𝐸𝑈௜௧ – would capture regional fixed effects, which are the effects we 
would like to reveal. If country fixed effects are included, then the coefficients in front of the 
three regions will be wiped out. In addition, as we include a broad set of explanatory variables 
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(competitiveness indicators and the other explanators), we believe there is sufficient ground to 
capture other aspects of country characteristics, part of which are certainly time-invariant. 
Therefore, equation (1) will be estimated by relying on a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method for estimating the unknown parameters in a linear regression model. The existence of 
the regional dummies and the time fixed effects impose sufficient panel structure of the 
calculations. 
The source of the data is multiple. Inward FDI flows are taken from UNCTAD. 
Competitiveness indicators are sourced from the Global Competitiveness Report: they range 
between 1 – low performance to 7 – high performance. The source of the remaining variables 
is the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. The referent period is 2007-2017. 
In equation (1), competitiveness indicators are each examined separately. This is mainly 
because of their considerable mutual correlation, which prevents putting them in one equation 
altogether. Table 1 presents a correlation matrix of the competitiveness indicators and suggests 
that almost all of them are inter-related with a correlation coefficient of over 50% and 
statistically significant. This justifies our approach of investigating their relationship with FDI 
in equation (1) separately. 
Table 2 provides the basic descriptive statistics of the variables utilized in the study. Note that 
almost one fourth (23%) of the countries involved correspond to the definition of a small state, 
while 42% are transition economies. 
 
Results and discussion 
Baseline results appear in Table 3. Each column represents one competitiveness indicator, 
found in the second row of the table. Results robustly suggest that competitiveness is related 
to higher inflow of FDI into the country. Most of the competitiveness indicators are positive 
and significant, with the exception of the macroeconomic environment (which is negative) and 
health and primary education (which is insignificant). Coefficients suggest that an increase of 
the competitiveness indicator by one unit (on the 1-7 scale) is related to an increase of inward 
FDI by about 40-50%, which is considerable. Results also identify three areas of 
competitiveness that are particularly important for FDI: goods market efficiency, market size 
and business sophistication. The coefficients on these three competitiveness pillars are large 
and range from 90% to 173%. The first two are related to the placement of products: FDI – 
especially the inflows of the last two decades – mainly sought competitively priced labour but 
also sufficiently large markets which countries frequently crafted by securing free-trade 
agreements or belonging to economic unions at higher level of integration. The third aspect 
reflects FDI’s shift towards services and technology-based manufacturing observed since the 
1980s (Curtis et al., 2013). 
Small countries attract less FDI as may be expected, given that we measure FDI in their logged 
absolute amount (Kravis and Lipsey, 1982). Similarly, transition economies attract less FDI 
compared to non-transition economies in the sample, which is also expected given their level 
of development, market size and economic structure emerging from a centrally-planned 
economy. In contrast, EU member states attract more FDI than non-members, which relates to 
the advantages of integration, but also to other factors such as the countries’ level of 
development, the robustness of their economic structure and the probity of their financial 
institutions. 
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Table 1: Correlation matrix of competitiveness indicators. 
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no
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n 
Institutions 1 
           
Infrastructure 0.7885* 1 
          
Macro-
environment 
0.4978* 0.3660* 1 
         
Health and 
primary 
education 
0.6238* 0.7260* 0.1800* 1 
        
Higher 
education 
0.7027* 0.7890* 0.2850* 0.8709* 1 
       
Goods market 
efficiency 
0.8885* 0.7808* 0.4540* 0.6770* 0.7532* 1 
      
Labour market 
efficiency 
0.6473* 0.4752* 0.4307* 0.3910* 0.5793* 0.6455* 1 
     
Financial 
market 
0.7711* 0.5602* 0.5187* 0.4805* 0.5689* 0.7624* 0.6032* 1 
    
Technological 
readiness 
0.7364* 0.8513* 0.3577* 0.8083* 0.8702* 0.7941* 0.5625* 0.6039* 1 
   
Market size 0.1620* 0.4531* 0.1287* 0.2535* 0.3314* 0.1972* -0.0723 0.1157* 0.2917* 1 
  
Business 
sophistication 
0.8634* 0.8450* 0.4034* 0.7250* 0.8206* 0.8753* 0.5740* 0.7437* 0.8195* 0.4435* 1 
 
Innovation 0.8339* 0.8144* 0.3925* 0.7320* 0.8492* 0.7925* 0.6027* 0.6749* 0.8329* 0.4045* 0.9266* 1 
Source: Authors’ calculations. * refers to a statistical significance at the 5% confidence level. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics. 
 
Variable Obs  Mean   Std.Dev   Min   Max   
Log of inward FDI 622 8.12 1.65 2.56 12.28 
Competitiveness 
indicators 
Institutions 647 4.38 0.88 2.66 6.18 
Infrastructure 647 4.55 1.01 2.05 6.65 
Macro-environment 647 4.96 0.89 2.27 6.84 
Health and primary education 647 5.97 0.42 4.72 6.90 
Higher education 647 4.71 0.70 3.06 6.27 
Goods market efficiency 647 4.50 0.51 2.99 5.62 
Labour market efficiency 647 4.39 0.55 2.79 5.95 
Financial market 647 4.24 0.71 2.39 6.17 
Technological readiness 647 4.55 1.03 2.14 6.46 
Market size 647 4.01 0.98 1.31 6.02 
Business sophistication 647 4.33 0.75 2.54 5.93 
Innovation 647 3.72 0.90 2.01 5.82 
Regional 
dummies 
Small country 660 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Transition country 660 0.42 0.49 0 1 
EU member 660 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Other controls Trade to GDP 653 105.80 54.46 30.02 423.99 
Log of GDP per capita 660 10.04 0.80 7.54 11.77 
Domestic credit to GDP 645 75.25 45.32 4.25 253.26 
Inflation 595 3.85 4.93 (4.86) 48.72 
Total tax in commercial profits 649 38.01 15.70 7.4 84.5 
Custom burden 647 4.41 0.82 2.50 6.30 
Unemployment rate 660 9.45 5.95 0.12 34.93 
 
 
The other explanatory variables have largely the expected sign and some of them are 
significant. Trade openness, availability of credit and the level of development of the country 
are all positively related to FDI, while higher customs burden deters FDI. Interestingly, total 
taxes are correlated with more FDIs, but the result is not robust and the coefficient is very 
small. Annex 2 presents a correlation matrix of these variables with competitiveness indicators. 
As could be noted, some correlations are fairly high, hence potentially interfering with our key 
results. To prevent this, the annex also provides a robustness check, whereby Table 3 is 
replicated without using the controls. Results remain robust to this treatment. 
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Table 3: Baseline results. 
 Dependent variable: Log of inward FDI 
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n 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Competitiveness 
indicator 
0.349** 0.441*** -0.182** 0.284 0.401*** 1.725*** 0.453*** 0.510*** 0.558*** 1.372*** 0.903*** 0.454*** 
(0.152) (0.100) (0.084) (0.259) (0.151) (0.216) (0.170) (0.123) (0.136) (0.090) (0.148) (0.101) 
Small country -1.48*** -1.40*** -1.47*** -1.47*** -1.44*** -1.49*** -1.42*** -1.43*** -1.43*** -0.084 -1.33*** -1.34*** 
(0.148) (0.149) (0.149) (0.148) (0.149) (0.141) (0.146) (0.149) (0.151) (0.176) (0.145) (0.147) 
Transition 
country 
-0.346** -0.354** -0.327* -0.431** -0.575*** -0.292* -0.779*** -0.498*** -0.592*** -0.064 -0.264 -0.449*** 
(0.172) (0.167) (0.166) (0.169) (0.173) (0.169) (0.212) (0.171) (0.172) (0.139) (0.167) (0.167) 
EU member 0.520*** 0.399** 0.273* 0.369** 0.373** 0.490*** 0.598*** 0.441*** 0.349** -0.271* 0.407*** 0.480*** 
(0.170) (0.156) (0.165) (0.160) (0.157) (0.152) (0.176) (0.157) (0.156) (0.141) (0.151) (0.156) 
Trade to GDP 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.011*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
0.818*** 0.660*** 1.026*** 0.826*** 0.750*** 0.738*** 0.797*** 0.792*** 0.593*** -0.06 0.627*** 0.702*** 
(0.127) (0.130) (0.131) (0.136) (0.134) (0.121) (0.127) (0.125) (0.153) (0.119) (0.131) (0.132) 
Credit to GDP 0.004** 0.003 0.004** 0.004* 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004** 0.001 0.007*** 0.002 0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inflation  0.020* 0.016 0.013 0.019 0.018 0.030** 0.023* 0.028** 0.028** -0.016 0.027** 0.020* 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Customs burden -0.440*** -0.451*** -0.142 -0.216* -0.331*** -0.832*** -0.317*** -0.383*** -0.453*** -0.052 -0.549*** -0.433*** 
(0.144) (0.121) (0.110) (0.112) (0.110) (0.119) (0.110) (0.116) (0.108) (0.091) (0.114) (0.104) 
Total tax in GDP 0.010** 0.007* 0.013*** 0.010** 0.008* 0.013*** 0.011** 0.013*** 0.006 -0.006 0.005 0.006 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Unemployment 
rate 
0.013 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.011 0.032*** 0.019* 0.019** 0.012 -0.003 0.022** 0.011 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant -0.27 1.34 -1.021 -1.21 0.057 -4.082*** -0.807 -1.134 1.987 3.123*** -0.166 1.027 
(1.215) (1.270) (1.235) (1.343) (1.238) (1.271) (1.219) (1.205) (1.428) (1.051) (1.242) (1.262)              
Observations 533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  
R-squared 48.3% 49.1% 48.3% 47.9% 48.5% 52.6% 48.6% 49.3% 49.5% 63.7% 50.9% 49.7% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** refer to a statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Time fixed effects not 
shown due to space.  
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Since we measure inward FDI in its logged absolute value, we cannot derive important 
conclusions about how country size and transition status relate to FDI only by referring to the 
two dummies included; they will always be negative, since small and transition countries 
typically attract less FDI. However, we may utilize this information further. In Table 4, we add 
the interaction of the small country status and the competitiveness indicators, while in Table 5, 
the one of the transition status and the competitiveness indicator. By so doing, we are able to 
judge if a small country that improves its competitiveness environment is advantaged in 
relation to a large country doing so, with respect to FDI attraction. The same question holds 
for the transition vis-à-vis non-transition countries. 
Table 4 presents the results on the competitiveness-FDI nexus when the size of the country is 
specifically considered. Two greyed lines in the table are important for this consideration. First, 
the coefficients on the competitiveness indicators largely contain their previous magnitudes 
and significances, which corroborates our previous findings and conclusions. When the 
coefficient on the interaction between competitiveness and the small country is considered, 
then important conclusions emerge. First, almost all coefficients are significant, suggesting that 
the positive relationship between competitiveness and FDI is weakened or wiped out in a small 
country. This is a clear sign that, because of their size, small countries need to undertake extra 
efforts in converting their investments into improved competitiveness for FDI attraction.  
Second, results suggest that in some cases the negative coefficients on the interactions 
outweigh the positive ones on the competitiveness indicators. This is particularly the case for 
institutions, infrastructure, health and education, labour market and innovation. It may suggest 
that these areas of competitiveness may have been particularly aggravated in small countries 
so that, for these to work positively for FDI attraction, a sustained effort is needed. On the other 
hand, the net result is still positive in the case of goods-market efficiency, financial market 
development, technical readiness, market size, and business sophistication, part of which are 
the spheres where the relationship between competitiveness and FDI has been the largest. It 
may also refer to areas where small countries have already pursued early reforms so as to take 
advantage in attracting FDI. Overall, however, small countries are shackled the trying to attract 
FDI, compared to big(ger) counterparts, based on their competitiveness reforms. Constrained 
by their size, they may require greater efforts to achieve the same result in terms of the 
competitiveness-FDI nexus achieved by larger countries. 
The other coefficients in Table 4 remain largely the same as in Table 3, hence serving as a 
check of the robustness of results. 
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Table 4: Results: Competitiveness and FDIs in small countries. 
 Dependent variable: Log of inward FDI 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Competitiveness 
indicator 
0.322** 0.430*** -0.167** 0.473* 0.455*** 1.699*** 0.570*** 0.580*** 0.591*** 1.478*** 0.826*** 0.470*** 
(0.152) (0.099) (0.082) (0.267) (0.150) (0.215) (0.174) (0.130) (0.134) (0.091) (0.153) (0.102) 
Small country 0.751 1.372** -0.974 6.359*** 3.889*** 1.122 4.803*** -0.077 1.003* 3.739*** 1.212 0.944 
(0.749) (0.578) (1.032) (1.642) (0.851) (1.212) (1.470) (0.756) (0.574) (0.539) (0.953) (0.615) 
Competitiveness 
* Small country 
-0.500*** -0.625*** -0.099 -1.29*** -1.125*** -0.574** -1.354*** -0.317* -0.533*** -1.27*** -0.613*** -0.655*** 
(0.176) (0.139) (0.204) (0.281) (0.185) (0.275) (0.326) (0.179) (0.131) (0.178) (0.237) (0.180) 
Transition 
country 
-0.394** -0.420** -0.344** -0.421** -0.502*** -0.330* -0.847*** -0.534*** -0.630*** -0.05 -0.315* -0.454*** 
(0.171) (0.167) (0.167) (0.169) (0.171) (0.169) (0.213) (0.174) (0.174) (0.133) (0.168) (0.168) 
EU member 0.469*** 0.417*** 0.289* 0.364** 0.381** 0.490*** 0.571*** 0.439*** 0.347** -0.193 0.401*** 0.452*** 
(0.168) (0.152) (0.162) (0.156) (0.151) (0.152) (0.172) (0.157) (0.152) (0.138) (0.150) (0.153) 
Trade to GDP 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
0.858*** 0.671*** 1.023*** 0.796*** 0.736*** 0.750*** 0.812*** 0.793*** 0.594*** -0.074 0.672*** 0.751*** 
(0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.136) (0.132) (0.122) (0.126) (0.126) (0.154) (0.118) (0.134) (0.134) 
Credit to GDP 0.004** 0.004* 0.004* 0.004** 0.003* 0.003* 0.002 0.004* 0.001 0.005*** 0.003 0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inflation  0.026** 0.025** 0.014 0.025** 0.027** 0.032*** 0.030** 0.031*** 0.036*** -0.017 0.031** 0.027** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Customs burden -0.398*** -0.412*** -0.141 -0.222** -0.258** -0.809*** -0.320*** -0.408*** -0.439*** -0.022 -0.505*** -0.414*** 
(0.144) (0.121) (0.110) (0.111) (0.110) (0.120) (0.112) (0.118) (0.109) (0.090) (0.115) (0.106) 
Total tax in GDP 0.011** 0.008* 0.013*** 0.011** 0.010** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.008* -0.008** 0.006 0.007 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Unemployment 
rate 
0.005 -0.006 0.001 -0.007 -0.003 0.027*** 0.012 0.018** 0.003 -0.011 0.013 0.005 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) 
Constant -0.799 0.939 -1.074 -2.076 -0.585 -4.237*** -1.492 -1.384 1.498 2.918*** -0.536 0.22 
(1.225) (1.262) (1.257) (1.380) (1.226) (1.269) (1.210) (1.224) (1.444) (1.036) (1.241) (1.267) 
Observations 533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  
R-squared 49.0% 50.5% 48.3% 49.2% 50.9% 53.0% 50.1% 49.5% 50.7% 65.9% 51.4% 50.7% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** refer to a statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Time fixed effects not 
shown due to space.  
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Table 5 presents the relationship between competitiveness and FDI when transition status is 
considered. While small countries may face insufficient market size and insufficient funds and 
capacities to pursue reforms to enhance competitiveness, transition economies may suffer other 
problems impeding reforms, such as unfavourable economic structure, inadequate educational 
systems, even cultural settings inherited from the socialist past which favours paper 
qualifications rather than skills, inclination to seek employment with the public service, risk 
avoidance and innovation non-preparedness. We need to note, however, that many of the 
transition economies are at the same time small, so that any impediments to competitiveness 
may be reinforced by small country size. 
Results, however, overturn these considerations, to some extent. The coefficient on the 
competitiveness indicator in Table 5 remains robust as in Tables 3 and 4. Furthermore, the 
coefficient on the product of the competitiveness and transition country is largely insignificant. 
It does not lend support to the hypothesis that transition economies are disadvantaged in 
improving their competitiveness to attract FDI. Observed together, Tables 4 and 5 suggest that 
it is rather the size of the country and not the fact that it has gone through a transition process 
which potentially interferes negatively on how competitiveness works for attracting FDI. The 
results are in line with those of Resmini (2000), suggesting that foreign investors prefer large 
markets in regard to transition countries from Central and Eastern Europe.   
It follows that small states lack enough capacity to absorb much FDI. In line with the results in 
Table 4, this may be related to a weak infrastructure which requires large financial resources 
for its improvement that cannot be easily generated or borrowed by small states. A lack of 
capacity to build strong institutions may also contribute to lower FDI in small states. Labour 
market inefficiency may be greater in small states driven by inadequate resources to invest in 
education, which consequently result in limited innovative capability. All these factors 
challenge much more the small states than the transition economies to attract FDI.      
In Table 5, there are notable exceptions to this general conclusion. For some of the 
competitiveness indicators, the transition status of the country still worked to disadvantage the 
competitiveness-FDI relationship. These pillars include infrastructure, goods-market 
efficiency, financial market, technological readiness and innovation. Though, in all cases the 
negative coefficient on the interaction is smaller than the positive coefficient on the 
competitiveness indicator. We should note that the transition status actually worked negatively 
in the competitiveness-FDI link in the areas where the relationship between the two is most 
productive. This highlights some differences between the transition and other (mainly more 
developed) countries in the sample, in line with Anastassopoulos (2007) who estimated that 
FDI determinants differ between northern (more developed) and southern EU member states. 
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Table 5: Results: Competitiveness and FDIs in transition countries. 
 Dependent variable: Log of inward FDI 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Competitiveness 
indicator 
0.358** 0.479*** -0.225** 0.402 0.412*** 1.830*** 0.389** 0.628*** 0.555*** 1.365*** 0.901*** 0.450*** 
(0.153) (0.101) (0.098) (0.268) (0.155) (0.234) (0.191) (0.125) (0.135) (0.096) (0.147) (0.100) 
Small country 0.372 0.576 -1.160* 1.362 -0.249 2.017* -1.974 1.681** 0.61 -0.156 1.144 0.759 
(0.970) (0.524) (0.686) (2.003) (0.887) (1.219) (1.310) (0.785) (0.544) (0.462) (0.880) (0.725) 
Competitiveness * 
Transition country 
-0.187 -0.227* 0.173 -0.307 -0.072 -0.543* 0.279 -0.549*** -0.286** 0.023 -0.363 -0.364* 
(0.251) (0.129) (0.149) (0.341) (0.196) (0.283) (0.308) (0.192) (0.125) (0.107) (0.225) (0.216) 
Transition country -1.436*** -1.376*** -1.491*** -1.465*** -1.435*** -1.416*** -1.449*** -1.395*** -1.389*** -0.079 -1.290*** -1.315*** 
(0.166) (0.149) (0.149) (0.147) (0.151) (0.148) (0.148) (0.146) (0.149) (0.181) (0.146) (0.146) 
EU member 0.523*** 0.416*** 0.233 0.382** 0.384** 0.539*** 0.583*** 0.528*** 0.415*** -0.270* 0.446*** 0.487*** 
(0.170) (0.156) (0.175) (0.161) (0.161) (0.151) (0.178) (0.158) (0.158) (0.142) (0.152) (0.156) 
Trade to GDP 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.011*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log GDP per capita 0.823*** 0.693*** 1.020*** 0.839*** 0.759*** 0.746*** 0.803*** 0.831*** 0.665*** -0.065 0.670*** 0.770*** 
(0.126) (0.129) (0.129) (0.137) (0.134) (0.121) (0.128) (0.124) (0.155) (0.126) (0.131) (0.137) 
Credit to GDP 0.004* 0.003 0.004** 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.007*** 0.002 0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inflation  0.020* 0.017 0.014 0.019 0.019 0.030** 0.021* 0.028** 0.026** -0.016 0.027** 0.022* 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Customs burden -0.408** -0.440*** -0.136 -0.215* -0.330*** -0.806*** -0.310*** -0.400*** -0.420*** -0.049 -0.527*** -0.403*** 
(0.159) (0.122) (0.110) (0.112) (0.110) (0.121) (0.109) (0.115) (0.108) (0.092) (0.115) (0.104) 
Total tax in GDP 0.011** 0.008* 0.013*** 0.010** 0.008* 0.014*** 0.010** 0.014*** 0.007 -0.006 0.007 0.008* 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Unemployment rate 0.013 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.01 0.031*** 0.020** 0.024** 0.01 -0.003 0.019** 0.01 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
Constant -0.519 0.729 -0.777 -2.041 -0.1 -4.772*** -0.615 -2.018 1.024 3.197*** -0.73 0.108 
(1.248) (1.292) (1.188) (1.606) (1.307) (1.379) (1.218) (1.233) (1.500) (1.167) (1.281) (1.360) 
Observations 533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  533  
R-squared 48.4% 49.4% 48.4% 48.0% 48.5% 52.9% 48.6% 50.0% 49.9% 63.7% 51.1% 49.9% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** refer to a statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Time fixed effects not shown 
due to space.  
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Conclusion 
This study investigated the relationship between various facets of competitiveness and FDI 
inflow in a set of 60 countries over the period 2007-2017. We put particular emphasis on how 
the size of the country and/or its transition status potentially interfered with the 
competitiveness-FDI nexus. We rely on a standard equation where FDI inflows depend on 
competitiveness indicators and a set of determinants which are usually considered in the 
literature. 
Results suggest that an increase of competitiveness is robustly, statistically and sizably 
correlated to an increase of FDI inflows. In particular, three spots of competitiveness were 
identified to have been particularly important for FDI: efficiency in the market for goods, 
market size and business sophistication. However, the positive relationship between 
competitiveness and FDI is weakened or wiped out in a small country. This suggests that, 
because of their size, small countries need to work even harder to render themselves attractive 
to FDI. Institutions, infrastructure, health and education, labour market development and 
innovation have been identified as being particularly aggravated in the small countries when 
the ‘competitiveness-FDI’ link is considered. All these factors challenge much more the small 
states than the transition economies to attract FDI. On the other hand, we do not find robust 
evidence that transition economies are disadvantaged in improving their competitiveness to 
attract FDI. Since many transition economies are small, it is probably the size of the country 
(and not the fact that it has gone through transition process) which potentially negatively 
interferes in how competitiveness works for attracting FDI. 
 
Note 
 
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, the University American 
College Skopje or Finance Think – Economic Research & Policy Institute.  
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Annex 1 
Table A1. Variables’ definitions and sources 
 
Variable Explanation Source  
Log of inward FDI The amount of FDI 
received in US$, logged 
UNCTAD 
Competitiveness 
indicators 
Institutions Different facets of 
country’s competitiveness 
measured on 1-7 scale 
(1=extremely inefficient to 
7=extremely efficient) 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Report 
Infrastructure 
Macro-environment 
Health and primary ed. 
Higher ed. 
Goods market efficiency 
Labour market efficiency 
Financial market 
Technological readiness 
Market size 
Business sophistication 
Innovation 
Regional 
dummies 
Small country A dummy with value of 1 
if the country has fewer 
than 3 million inhabitants 
and 0 otherwise 
World Development 
Indicators 
Transition country A dummy with value of 1 
if the country transited 
from central planning to 
market economy and 0 
otherwise 
World Development 
Indicators 
EU member A dummy with value of 1 
if the country is a member 
of the EU and 0 otherwise 
World Development 
Indicators 
Other controls Trade to GDP Imports + Exports divided 
by GDP 
World Development 
Indicators 
Log of GDP per capita Per capita GDP (PPP, 
international dollars), 
logged 
World Development 
Indicators 
Domestic credit to GDP Amount of credit extended 
by banks domestically to 
GDP 
World Development 
Indicators 
Inflation Annual growth of prices World Development 
Indicators 
Total tax in commercial profits The amount of taxes 
collected divided by 
companies’ profits 
World Development 
Indicators 
Custom burden A measure of the burden of 
customs procedures 
(1=extremely inefficient to 
7=extremely efficient) 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Report 
Unemployment rate The rate of unemployed to 
active labour force 
World Development 
Indicators 
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Annex 2 
Table A2: Correlation matrix of competitiveness indicators with the rest of the variables. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. All correlations are statistically significant at the 5%.   
Table A3: Baseline results without controls. 
 Dependent variable: Log of inward FDI 
 
In
st
itu
tio
ns
 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 
M
ac
ro
-
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
H
ea
lth
 
an
d 
pr
im
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
ig
he
r 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
G
oo
ds
 m
ar
ke
t 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
L
ab
ou
r 
m
ar
ke
t 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
m
ar
ke
t 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
ic
al
 
re
ad
in
es
s 
M
ar
ke
t s
iz
e 
B
us
in
es
s 
so
ph
is
tic
at
io
n 
In
no
va
tio
n 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Competitiveness 
indicator 
0.295*** 0.537*** 0.207*** 0.917*** 0.625*** 0.853*** 0.586*** 0.434*** 0.568*** 1.000*** 0.746*** 0.513*** 
(0.083) (0.070) (0.062) (0.194) (0.107) (0.122) (0.097) (0.083) (0.071) (0.066) (0.093) (0.074) 
Small country -1.316*** -1.281*** -1.233*** -1.363*** -1.283*** -1.426*** -1.326*** -1.316*** -1.408*** 0.116 -1.219*** -1.177*** 
(0.126) (0.128) (0.120) (0.131) (0.131) (0.124) (0.125) (0.119) (0.128) (0.141) (0.126) (0.123) 
Transition 
country 
-0.858*** -0.540*** -1.135*** -0.846*** -0.899*** -0.716*** -1.166*** -0.954*** -0.693*** -0.639*** -0.506*** -0.719*** 
(0.141) (0.144) (0.111) (0.132) (0.122) (0.122) (0.109) (0.112) (0.124) (0.106) (0.138) (0.131) 
EU member 0.940*** 0.602*** 1.014*** 0.663*** 0.593*** 0.769*** 0.954*** 0.867*** 0.428*** 0.462*** 0.612*** 0.717*** 
(0.106) (0.126) (0.105) (0.134) (0.133) (0.108) (0.104) (0.105) (0.132) (0.106) (0.113) (0.110) 
Constant 7.628*** 6.708*** 7.946*** 3.747*** 6.283*** 5.155*** 6.479*** 6.996*** 6.914*** 4.912*** 5.648*** 7.066*** 
(0.442) (0.356) (0.351) (1.134) (0.497) (0.589) (0.449) (0.433) (0.320) (0.322) (0.458) (0.346)              
Observations 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 
R-squared 39.3% 43.0% 39.2% 40.4% 41.8% 42.0% 41.5% 40.3% 43.4% 54.9% 43.1% 42.6% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** refer to a statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. Time fixed effects not 
shown due to space.  
 
